metznet-channel/scripts/seal-age-key.sh

87 lines
3.7 KiB
Bash

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# One-time, per-machine provisioning: generate an age keypair and seal the
# private half inside that machine's TPM, bound to a PCR policy so it only
# unseals on that same machine in the same (measured) boot state. The
# *public* key becomes a recipient in .sops.yaml (safe to commit); the
# *sealed* TPM object is what metznet/services/secrets.scm's activation
# script unseals at boot via tpm2_unseal -- the raw private key never
# touches disk outside this script's own tmpdir, and that tmpdir is wiped
# on exit.
#
# Requires a real TPM 2.0 device (or a software one, e.g. swtpm, for
# testing -- see docker/README.md's "Secrets (sops + TPM)" section).
# Docker Desktop on macOS exposes neither, so this only runs on real
# Linux hardware (or inside a container with /dev/tpmrm0 passed through,
# or TPM2TOOLS_TCTI pointed at a swtpm instance).
#
# usage: seal-age-key.sh <persistent-handle> [pcr-selection]
# persistent-handle e.g. 0x81010001 -- must match the tpm-handle field
# of the <secrets-configuration> using this key
# pcr-selection default: sha256:7 (UEFI Secure Boot state). Adjust
# to match your actual measured-boot setup -- this
# default has NOT been validated against a real
# metznet machine's PCR layout yet.
set -euo pipefail
handle="${1:?usage: $0 <persistent-handle> [pcr-selection]}"
pcrs="${2:-sha256:7}"
command -v tpm2_createprimary >/dev/null || { echo "tpm2-tools not found" >&2; exit 1; }
command -v age-keygen >/dev/null || { echo "age-keygen not found" >&2; exit 1; }
tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'shred -u "$tmpdir"/age-key.txt "$tmpdir"/age-key-raw.txt 2>/dev/null; rm -rf "$tmpdir"' EXIT
age-keygen -o "$tmpdir/age-key.txt" 2>"$tmpdir/pubkey.txt"
pubkey="$(grep -o 'age1[a-z0-9]*' "$tmpdir/pubkey.txt")"
# TPM2 sealed-data objects cap out around 128 bytes -- age-keygen's file
# (comments + key, ~190 bytes) doesn't fit, but age/sops don't need the
# comments: just the bare AGE-SECRET-KEY-1... line (~74 bytes) is a fully
# valid identity file on its own.
grep -v '^#' "$tmpdir/age-key.txt" > "$tmpdir/age-key-raw.txt"
tpm2_createprimary -C o -c "$tmpdir/primary.ctx" >/dev/null
tpm2_startauthsession -S "$tmpdir/session.ctx" >/dev/null
tpm2_policypcr -S "$tmpdir/session.ctx" -l "$pcrs" -L "$tmpdir/pcr.policy" >/dev/null
tpm2_flushcontext "$tmpdir/session.ctx" >/dev/null
# Real and virtual TPMs alike commonly support only 2-3 transient object
# slots at once. Each of these commands reloads primary.ctx from disk
# (that's the whole point of context files), so flushing every loaded
# transient object between steps is always safe -- nothing but the
# freshly-saved context files is needed to continue. Without this,
# chaining create -> load -> evictcontrol reliably exhausts a 3-slot TPM
# ("out of memory for object contexts").
tpm2_flushcontext -t >/dev/null
tpm2_create -C "$tmpdir/primary.ctx" -u "$tmpdir/seal.pub" -r "$tmpdir/seal.priv" \
-a "fixedtpm|fixedparent|adminwithpolicy" \
-i "$tmpdir/age-key-raw.txt" -L "$tmpdir/pcr.policy" >/dev/null
tpm2_flushcontext -t >/dev/null
tpm2_load -C "$tmpdir/primary.ctx" -u "$tmpdir/seal.pub" -r "$tmpdir/seal.priv" \
-c "$tmpdir/seal.ctx" >/dev/null
tpm2_flushcontext -t >/dev/null
tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c "$tmpdir/seal.ctx" "$handle" >/dev/null
cat <<EOF
Sealed a new age key into TPM handle $handle (PCR policy: $pcrs).
Recipient public key (add to .sops.yaml):
$pubkey
Update the machine's <secrets-configuration> to use:
(tpm-handle "$handle")
(pcr-policy "$pcrs")
Re-encrypt secrets/secrets.enc.yaml against the new recipient with:
sops updatekeys secrets/secrets.enc.yaml
The unsealed private key existed only in $tmpdir and has been shredded.
EOF