# Recipients for secrets/secrets.enc.yaml. Each entry is meant to be the # *public* half of an age key whose private half exists only sealed # inside one target machine's TPM (see scripts/seal-age-key.sh) -- never # on disk in plain text. Re-encrypt for a new/rotated recipient with: # sops updatekeys secrets/secrets.enc.yaml # # TEST FIXTURE: the key below is a disposable age key generated purely to # prove the sops mechanism structurally (guix system build / docker-image # succeeding) -- it was never sealed into a real TPM and secrets.enc.yaml # holds a placeholder value, not a real credential. Run # scripts/seal-age-key.sh on the real kerberos.metznet.ca hardware and # replace this recipient (and %kerberos-secrets-tpm-handle in # metznet/machines/kerberos.scm) before relying on this for real. creation_rules: - path_regex: secrets/secrets\.enc\.yaml$ age: age1cfqm9lzjf7y3kvjca5r06kvy84p6a5efh5p79m3xxwehyfh3gqgqefqgvw